

# On the algebraic degree of some SHA-3 candidates

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March 22, 2012



# Outline

- 1 Motivation
- 2 Main result
- 3 Application to ECHO and JH

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# Iterated permutations

Most of the **symmetric constructions** (hash functions, block ciphers ...) are based on a **permutation iterated a high number of times**.

Important to estimate the **algebraic degree** of such iterated permutations.

Functions with a **low degree** are vulnerable to:

- **Higher-order differential attacks** and **distinguishers** (e.g. zero-sum distinguishers ...)
- **Cube attacks**
- **Algebraic attacks**

Algebraic degree of a vectorial function  $F : \mathbf{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_2^m$ 

**Example** (Inverse of Keccak's Sbox):

$$\begin{aligned}
 F(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) = & (x_0 + x_2 + x_4 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_4 + x_3x_4 + x_1x_3x_4, \\
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The algebraic degree of  $F$  is 3.

# Degree of an iterated function

Let  $F, G : \mathbf{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_2^n$ .

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**When the Walsh coefficients of  $F$  are divisible by  $2^\ell$ .**

[Canteaut-Videau '02]

$$\deg(G \circ F) \leq n - \ell + \deg G$$

**When  $F$  is the concatenation of smaller balanced functions over**

$\mathbf{F}_{2^{n_0}}$  [Boura Canteaut DeCannière '11]

$$\deg(G \circ F) \leq n - \frac{n - \deg G}{n_0 - 1}$$

# The case of Keccak

Keccak [Bertoni *et al.* 08]

**Nonlinearity** :  $5 \times 5$  nonlinear permutation  $\chi$ .  
 $\deg(\chi) = 2$ ,  $\deg(\chi^{-1}) = 3$ .

The resistance of Keccak against **zero-sum distinguishers** has been widely studied.

- **Trivial bound**: 16-round distinguisher.
- [Canteaut Videau 02]: 18-round distinguisher.
- [Boura Canteaut DeCannière '11]: 24-round distinguisher.

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**Observation** of [Duan-Lai 11]:

The product of any **two** coordinates of  $\chi^{-1}$  is of degree **3**.

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# A new result

$\delta_k(F)$ : maximal degree of the **product** of  $k$  coordinates of  $F$

[Duan-Lai 11]:  $\delta_2(\chi^{-1}) = 3$ .

**Question:** Is  $\delta_2(\chi^{-1})$  related to  $\deg(\chi)$ ?

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**Theorem:** Let  $F$  be a permutation of  $\mathbf{F}_2^n$ . Then, for any integers  $k$  and  $\ell$ ,

$$\delta_\ell(F) < n - k \text{ if and only if } \delta_k(F^{-1}) < n - \ell.$$

# Application to Keccak

**Corollary:** Let  $F$  be a permutation of  $\mathbf{F}_2^n$ . Then, for any integer  $\ell$

$$\delta_\ell(F) < n - 1 \text{ if and only if } \deg(F^{-1}) < n - \ell.$$

**Case of Keccak:** For  $F = \chi^{-1}$  and  $\ell = 2$ ,

$$\delta_2(\chi^{-1}) < 5 - 1 \text{ iff } \deg(\chi) < 5 - 2$$

# A new bound

**Theorem:** When  $F$  is a permutation,

$$\deg(G \circ F) < n - \left\lfloor \frac{n - 1 - \deg(G)}{\deg(F^{-1})} \right\rfloor.$$



Consequence when  $F$  is the concatenation of smaller permutations

**Proposition** [Boura Canteaut DeCannière '11]

Let  $F = (S, \dots, S)$ , where  $S$  is a permutation of  $\mathbf{F}_{2^{n_0}}$ . Then,

$$\deg(G \circ F) \leq n - \frac{n - \deg G}{\gamma(S)},$$

where

$$\gamma(S) = \max_{1 \leq i \leq n_0 - 1} \frac{n_0 - i}{n_0 - \delta_i(S)}.$$

In particular,

$$\gamma(S) \leq \max\left(\frac{n_0 - 1}{n_0 - \deg S}, n_0 - 2\right).$$

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
$$\gamma(S) \leq \max\left(\frac{n_0 - 1}{n_0 - \deg S}, \frac{n_0}{2} - 1, \deg S^{-1}\right).$$

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# ECHO


ECHO [Benadjila *et al.* 08]



- 2048-bit state (16 **AES** states)
- **BIG.SubWords** = 2 rounds of **AES**
- 16 parallel applications of **BIG.SubWords**.

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
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
What is the degree of **BIG.SubWords**?

**Trivial approach:**

$$\deg(\mathbf{BIG.SubWords}) \leq 7^2 = 49.$$

# The degree of `BIG.SubWords`


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


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
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
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


4 parallel applications of  $S_{32}$ .

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


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


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


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
$$\deg(S_{32}) \leq 32 - \frac{32 - 7}{7} \leq 28.$$

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# The degree of ECHO

4 parallel applications of

$S_{512}$



After the 1<sup>st</sup> Sbox layer of the 2<sup>nd</sup> round:

$$\deg \leq 7 \cdot 28 = 196$$

After 2 rounds:

$$\deg(S_{512}) \leq 512 - \frac{512 - 196}{7} \leq 466$$

After 4 rounds:


$$\deg(R^4) \leq 2048 - \frac{2048 - 466}{466} \leq 2045$$



# The degree of JH

JH [Wu 08]

42 rounds of a 1024-bit permutation  $R$




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# The degree of JH

JH [Wu 08]

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$S$ : Permutation over  $\mathbb{F}_2^4$  of degree 3. Then,

$$\deg(R^6) \leq 3^6 = 729.$$

# The degree of JH

For  $r \leq 8$ ,  $R^r$  can be seen as the concatenation of  $2^{9-r}$  permutations  $S^r$  over  $\mathbf{F}_2^{2^{r+1}}$ .

$r$	$\text{deg}(S^r)$
1	3
2	6
3	12
4	25
5	51
6	102
7	204
8	409

Then,  $\gamma(S^8) \leq 409$ , implying

$$\text{deg}(R^{16}) \leq 1024 - \frac{1024 - \text{deg}(S^8)}{\gamma(S^8)} \leq 1022.$$

# Conclusion

- The degree of  $F^{-1}$  affects the degree of  $G \circ F$ .
- **New bounds** on the degree of several iterated cryptographic primitives (ECHO, JH, Rijndael...)

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**Thank you for your attention**